The perspective-bound character of information and information processing gives rise to natural inconsistency. Natural inconsistency poses a problem if a common perspective is needed, for example when a shared (consistent) decision has to be made (by humans, within logics or by computers). There are three main approaches to solving the problem of common perspective: universalism; utilitarianism; and contractarianism. However, none of these approaches has ever been made computationally tractable. Inconsistency as a natural phenomenon explains why this can never be achieved. The core of the problem is that natural inconsistency not only exists at the level of perspectives on the actual situation, but it also exists at the level of the principles used to decide on a common perspective. There is no universal preferential ordering of perspectives at either level because there is no known, let alone universally recognized, universal processor. Furthermore, there is no exhaustive or non-contradictory set of universal or utilitarian principles or contracts available. An analysis of the solution to the problem of common perspective found in the legal domain can probably be extended to solve this problem in other domains. In this chapter, we recapitulate the Logic of Reasonable Inferences, which formalizes the reduction of all actual legal perspectives in a case to all formally valid legal perspectives. Subsequently, we make an inventory of commonly used tentative legal decision principles and categorize them into three classes. The properties of the three classes are then used to define the semantics of meta-predicates, which can be used to rank the remaining perspectives computationally. Finally, we illustrate the behavior of the Logic of Reasonable Inferences in combination with the meta-predicates by means of an elaborate legal example.
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Introduction: Inconsistent knowledge as a natural phenomenon
The naturally distributed character of information processing renders both information processing (know how) and the resulting information (know what) inherently perspective bound. This contextual quality of knowledge is independent of the human or non-human nature of the processors and it will exist as long as there is variation amongst the different processors or between their information content prior to communication. In both human communication and in computer networks such variation is not only common but also natural 1 , because communication (information exchange) between completely similar entities is impossible by definition. The perspective-bound character of information and information processing allows for natural inconsistency in the sense of inconsistency being the result of the different perspectives 2 as opposed to faulty perception or other forms of faulty processing such as processing on the basis of incomplete knowledge from a single perspective.
Natural inconsistency constitutes no general problem. It only generates a specific practical problem if a common perspective is needed. However, a common perspective is frequently required for a variety of reasons ranging from the demand to make a decision (on a common perspective or action) to the need for a decidable logic or for a finite algorithm. There are three main approaches to solving the problem of common perspective: universalism; utilitarianism; and contract-arianism. Universalism claims that decisions can be made on the basis of universal principles (cf Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative). Utilitarianism (cf David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill) claims that a decisive cost-benefit analysis can be made (cf Immanuel Kant's hypothetical imperative). Contractarianism avoids the semantic problems of utilitarianism by introducing a purely formal decision criterion (pacta sunt servanda). None of these approaches has ever been made computationally tractable. As a matter of fact, the computational tractability of these approaches can never be achieved because inconsistency is a natural phenomenon. The core of the problem is that natural inconsistency not only exists at the level of perspectives on the actual situation, but it also exists at the level of the principles used to decide on a common perspective. There is no universal preferential ordering of perspectives at both levels because there is no known, let alone a universally recognized, universal processor. Furthermore, there is no exhaustive or non-contradictory set of universal or utilitarian principles or contracts available.
Each domain of knowledge is more or less affected by this problem, but this effect is particularly intense in the domain of legal knowledge, since it consists of the rules and procedures used to describe and solve legal conflicts, which presupposes contradictory and hence inconsistent perspectives. An analysis of the solution to the problem of common perspective found in the legal domain can probably be used to solve this problem in other domains. Human processors of legal knowledge follow formal and informal problem-solving methods in order to reduce the number of legal perspectives and eventually to decide, temporally and within a specific context, on a common perspective. The formal methods are based on universal properties of formally valid legal argument. The informal methods are based on legal heuristics consisting in tentative legal decision principles. The first category can be formalized by logic because it applies peremptorily to all legal perspectives. The second category cannot be fully formalized by logic because, although it is commonly applicable, it can always be refuted by a contradictory decision principle and even by the mere existence of an underlying contradictory argument.
In this chapter we recapitulate the Logic of Reasonable Inferences (LRI), which formalizes the reduction of all given legal perspectives to all formally valid legal perspectives. Subsequently, we make an inventory of commonly used tentative legal decision principles and categorize them into three classes. The properties of the three classes are then used to define the semantics of meta-predicates, which can be used to rank the remaining perspectives computationally. Finally, we illustrate the behavior of the LRI in combination with the metapredicates by means of a complex legal example. Further research should elaborate on the formal properties of the three classes of meta-predicates and their applicability in other knowledge domains and in ranking algorithms.
Inconsistent knowledge in the legal domain
Legal, or more broadly, normative knowledge 3 is used to infer the normative characteristics of actual social situations. Legal knowledge is a subdivision of normative knowledge that is used in the formal legal (judicial) subsystem of social systems, such as countries, organizations or coalitions. Normative knowledge encompasses both normative opinions (know what) and the normative procedures (know how) that are used to infer these normative opinions. The normative characteristics that are inferred represent the mutual expectations of people about the conduct of others (rules of conduct). In a formal legal context, these expectations are commonly labeled as 'rights' (to the realization of conduct of others) and 'obligations' (of others to behave in agreement with the expectations).
Normative opinions range from informal to formal. On the informal side we find moral principles, social scripts, protocols, (technical) instructions, rules of thumb, rules of play etc. On the formal side we find legislation, legal principles, jurisprudence, policy rules etc. Normative opinions can be of a general (uninstantiated) and of a specific (instantiated) character. Normative procedures consist of (1) procedures to list all the normative opinions about a given situation that can be inferred from the given situation combined with the set of pre-existing normative opinions of the parties concerned and (2) procedures to reduce the number of normative opinions about the given situation to a (local and temporal) common opinion for (not necessarily of) the parties concerned. Both procedures involve legal reasoning. The second procedure also involves legal decision-making. Legal reasoning in the first class of procedures is concerned with the inference of normative opinions about the given situation. We will refer to this as "the object level". Legal reasoning in the second class of procedures is concerned with the inference of normative opinions about the reduction of normative opinions (e.g. "the judge is obliged to decide for a legally valid opinion"). We will refer to this as "the meta level". In the next two subsections, we will discuss the properties of legal knowledge that should be taken into consideration in order to be able to develop a tenable computational model.
Legal reasoning: reasonable inferences and tentative decisionmaking
Legal or normative reasoning has no unique qualities compared to reasoning in other domains of knowledge. Normative characteristics of social situations are inferred by plain logical deduction from (agreed or disputed) facts and normative opinions. Normative opinions can have facts (e.g. the conduct of others) or opinions as their subject. In the former case, expectations about the conduct of others in general are inferred (the object level). In the latter case, expectations about the application of opinions are inferred (the meta level). To be precise: at both levels, expectations about the conduct of others are inferred. At the object level this relates to conduct in general, while at the meta level it relates to conduct concerning the application of normative opinions.
Consequently, there is no formal difference between legal reasoning at the two levels. One could think that an idiosyncrasy of legal reasoning may be found in the above addition "agreed or disputed", but disagreements about facts and opinionated qualifications are part of every domain of knowledge. However, the representation of disagreements about facts and conflicting opinions and the (local and temporal) resolution of these disagreements and conflicts is the aim of, and therefore essential to, the practical application of legal knowledge. What is special about this particular aim is the local and temporal character of the resolution. The aim of the application of legal knowledge in a social situation is to decide on a common perspective in order to be able to act in a coordinated manner. The decision does not (necessarily) cause facts or individual opinions to change; it simply introduces a new fact, that of the common perspective. It is even necessary for all the disputed facts and opinions to be represented permanently because they are not only part of the decision-making process but remain part of the legitimation of the common perspective.
The continued representation of disputed facts and opinions, even after a decision regarding a common perspective has been made, is not only essential to the legitimation of the decision. Legal knowledge is ultimately dynamic, meaning not only that people can change their opinion sequentially over time but that they can also hold different opinions in parallel at any given time. Normative opinions change and differ with time and given context. A common perspective only holds for the given situation of the parties concerned. Furthermore, the parties need not merely maintain their individual opinions in parallel with the common, decided opinion, but they may also immediately renounce the common opinion either individually or in unison. It is not uncommon that parties decide to act contra legem, for example to maintain the status quo or just to avoid a bagatelle.
The world is not transformed into a consistent state as a consequence of the completion of the legal proceedings. Agreement is reached within one context, at one moment, in order to complete a singular legal transaction (e.g. a verdict). The judge and all other parties can stick to their original opinions in every other transaction, but they may and frequently will also change their opinions in the aftermath of legal proceedings. People may also continue to act in violation of a verdict. A verdict may be overruled or be revised. And even the law may change.
The preceding description of legal knowledge and legal reasoning renders any normative opinion relatively legally valid (i.e. legally valid within its own context) and thus allows the existence of contradictory opinions. Fortunately, there are some universal constraints that reduce the number of opinions that can be taken into consideration. These constraints are based on the legitimation principle, which is universally acknowledged in legal disputes and which comprises amongst others the principles of legal justification and legal rationality. The principle of legal justification demands that each derived normative opinion is based on a complete argument, meaning that the opinion reached is supported by facts and grounded opinions. The principle of rationality comes down to the demand that the derived opinion and the argument it is based on are non-contradictory. Psychologically, these demands amount to common characteristics of human cognition. Formally, they boil down to the requirements of valid deduction and consistency. A logic modeling legal reasoning should abide by these requirements. The formal demands of valid deduction and consistency of opinions and their justifications reduce the number of formally valid opinions (reasonable inferences), but in most cases they do not enable a reduction to a single common opinion. Unfortunately, there are no further formal (absolute) criteria to reduce all the remaining alternative formally valid legal opinions to a single common opinion.
In legal practice, tentative criteria are used to rank formally valid legal opinions. These criteria represent the arguments that the parties concerned normally accept as a basis for agreement on a common opinion. The ranking provides for a prediction of the relative probability that a common opinion will be agreed upon (by content or by procedure) and hold. So far, no statistical research has succeeded in yielding more than an ordinal ranking. Apart from that, the dynamic character of legal knowledge and the lack of available statistical data prohibit a model which includes more than an ordinal ranking. Conveniently, the parameters of the ranking are well-known as legal decision principles and policies, and they are a traditional subject of jurisprudential research.
Legal decision-making: three classes of decision principles
A jurisprudential and empirical analysis of the legal domain reveals the existence of three particular classes of principles used to evaluate the rules that are referred to in legal opinions . The first class of principles is that of (relative) legal validity. The second class of principles is that of legal exclusion, and the third class is that of legal preference. The application of these principles renders a rule legally valid or invalid (within a certain context) or entails the legal exclusion of one rule by another or the preference of one rule above another. All of these principles and the derived qualifications of the subjected rules are tentative. A legally invalid rule, a legally excluded rule or a rule that is legally not preferred is never absolutely legally invalid (i.e. invalid in any context). The inferences made with the aid of such rules are therefore not absolutely invalid either. The principles just provide for tentative ranking arguments. The principles of validity, exclusion and preference are expressed in a multitude of rules (at the meta level), concluding with the validity, exclusion or preference of other rules (at the object or at the meta level).
Legal validity (authority, competence and procedure) Legal validity relates to the authority of legal rules at the object and at the meta level. Meta-rules of this class qualify rules as valid or invalid on the basis of (mainly) the legal authority of their source and of formal legal features of the process of their creation. For example, rules with statutory law, judicial decisions or administrative decisions as a source can be qualified as valid or invalid depending on whether they satisfy the requirements of formal law with regard to authority, competence, procedure etc.. Rules based on private decisions (such as contractual agreements) are valid if the contracting parties are authorized and competent to decide about the subject of the contract and act according to the agreed procedures. Even rules of play can be valid if they are introduced by the appointed games master or if agreed by the majority of the games participants. In the legal domain, an opinion based on a valid rule ranks above an opinion based on a non-valid or invalid rule and an opinion based on a non-valid rule ranks above an opinion based on an invalid rule.
Legal exclusion (applicability)
If one rule legally excludes another rule, then the first rule is legally preferred above the second rule, and their combination is legally invalid. Furthermore, if they contradict each other, their combination is also formally invalid. Meta-rules of this class relate rules on the basis of common subject on the one hand (which renders them alternative rules) but on the other hand different space, time or specificity dimensions. Legally valid rules are commonly applicable within a certain territory or on a certain territorial (organizational) level or to persons situated on or connected (by their nationality or acts) to a certain territory, within a certain timeframe and on a certain level of detail/specificity. Common examples of legal exclusion are based on the legal principle of personality (national/regional/municipal law is only applicable to nationals etc.), the legal principle of territoriality (national/regional/-municipal law is only applicable to the national territory), the superior principle (higher laws, decisions of higher administrative bodies or courts overrule lower ones etc.), the posterior principle (more recent laws, decisions etc. exclude less recent ones) and the specialis principle (more specific laws, decisions etc. exclude more general ones).
Legal preference (balancing interests)
If one rule is legally preferred to another rule, the first rule ranks above the second, but if they do not contradict each other their combination is legally valid and is preferred above the application of just one of the rules (the so-called a fortiori argument). In most cases, the preference of one rule to another is related to the objectives (c.q. the expected effects of the application) of the rules. The antecedents of meta-rules of this class will generally be involved with the interests and values associated with these objectives. In this class of meta-rules, not only legal principles but also legal policies play a part. Examples of legal principles that define legal preference are the principle of equality before the law (c.f. precedents in common law) and the principle of legal security. Examples of policies that define legal preference are public/administrative policies (e.g. preferring economic growth to environmental protection or private spending above public spending) and prosecution policies (e.g. against bagatelles or balancing the supply of cases with the available capacity).
The extended Logic of Reasonable Inferences: a formal and computational approach to natural inconsistency
One element of our past research has been focused on building legal knowledge-based systems. These knowledge-based systems have been used to model legal knowledge in order to be able to empirically test our theoretical assumptions about this knowledge. As we have seen in the previous sections, one of these assumptions is that natural inconsistency is an essential part of (legal) knowledge. This assumption poses a problem when it comes to formalization. In order to be able to formalize natural inconsistency we have postulated that the theoretical principle of rationality holds universally, also in the legal domain, but that it holds separately from each possible perspective. The theoretical principle of rationality formally reduces to logical consistency. It demands that all formally valid opinions are internally consistent. This has forced us to define a logic that distinguishes all internally consistent opinions (reasonable inferences) that can be derived from a given situation and the full set of (a priori) known legal opinions, without discarding one of these a priori opinions, i.e. maintaining the natural (meaningful) inconsistency between alternative opinions. This formally associates our approach with inconsistency-tolerant or paraconsistent logics (cf section 3.1.2. below). More important, it distinguishes our approach from other approaches to inconsistency that are aimed at permanently or temporally resolving the inconsistency by retraction of one or more of the conflicting opinions according to one or another criterion (constraint satisfaction, exhaustion (dialogue logics), logics of preference, most default logics etc.) or at resolving the inconsistency by changing the semantics of the conflicting opinions (i.e. numerical representations that reduce conflicting opinions to a single opinion with a certain probability etc. , where we proposed a non-monotonic, dialogical approach using persuasion and negotiation to model data exchange in a network of distributed police databases where most arguments and their interrelations are known in advance. Numerical reduction hides the arguments of the reduction behind numerals. In our approach, conflicting opinions cannot be retracted or reduced because they have to be present in the next phase (that of legal decision-making) and remain present after that to legitimize the tentative (local and temporal) decisions for a common opinion.
In most cases this still leaves us with a multitude of internally consistent, but mutually inconsistent, alternative opinions. We have not found other universal formal principles used in legal practice to reduce the number of opinions, but we have found three classes of tentative principles (heuristics) commonly used in legal practice to rank formally valid legal opinions. In this section we will summarize the features of the Logic of Reasonable Inferences (LRI) that formalizes the universal features of legal knowledge and we will describe the computational characteristics of the three classes of tentative principles added to the LRI in the form of meta-predicates and meta-rules. To illustrate the application of the extended LRI in this section, we will use the following example from Dutch environmental law.
An example from Dutch environmental law
The Dutch Waste Products Law (WPL) obliges industries which "handle waste" to do so following the directions of an environmental license (section 31 WPL). The ambiguous concepts "handle" and "waste" and their combination have caused a vast body of rules of interpretation, which in many cases contradict each other. These contradictions have been the subject of many subsequent legal disputes. This can be elucidated with the example of rubble. Until 1980, according to common legal opinion, rubble was designated as "waste" and any use of rubble was labeled as "handling of waste". In 1981, however, this interpretation was refined by the "Kroon" (the highest body of administrative appeal). Waste was defined as any product which is no longer used for a specific purpose (KB May 29 1981 , BR 1982 , thus introducing an exception to the general rule. In a specific case, this meant that a farmer, who used rubble to fill up a ditch, thus not just dumping the rubble but using it to attain a purpose, did not need a WPL license. Some months later, the "Hoge Raad" (the highest body of civil appeal) decided that common parlance should be the criterion for the judgment of the waste property of any product (HR December 22, 1981 , NJ 1982 . According to this interpretation, a WPL license was needed in any case concerning rubble, even if it was used to fill up a ditch. Since there are no hierarchical regulations which grant higher authority to the opinions of either of these bodies of appeal, both interpretations were valid within the legal system at the same time. Although, in this specific case, a metarule exists stating that a court of law should adhere to its own previous jurisdiction, this meta-rule is not coercive but tentative in nature. This provides us with one of the many clear cut examples of alternative legal opinions, which can be used at will in cases coming up before any court of law. This was confirmed by the refusal of the "Kroon" to obey a directive from the minister for the environment to adjust to the jurisdiction of the "Hoge Raad" (UCV 32, December 10, 1984, p. 12/13). The conflict was finally resolved by legislation. Section 31 clause 3 WPL juncto "Werkenbesluit Afvalstoffenwet" declares that rubble is waste under any circumstance or use. In this case, a coercive meta-rule exists preferring legislation to jurisdiction. However, the conflict remains for any other material (except rubble) for which no specific definitions are included in the new legislation. So the interpretation rules of both the "Kroon" and the "Hoge Raad" are still valid except for rubble. This means that the rulings of the "Kroon" and the "Hoge Raad" cannot be removed from the rule-base. The introduced rule of law constitutes an exception to the present rules and calls for revision of some registered cases concerning rubble. Revision of registered cases is also needed if relevant factual circumstances change. In the case of rubble, the farmer can dump some material designated as waste, for instance wreckage, on top of the filled up ditch. This requalifies the rubble as waste according to common legal opinion (which should be comprised in the rule-base).
The Logic of Reasonable Inferences (LRI) and the extension with meta-predicates have been implemented to test their tenability empirically b, de Vey Mestdagh 1998 ]. This research has shown that the implementation (and consequentially the extended LRI) models most of the examined legal decisions (425 out of 430). In section 4 of this chapter, we will illustrate the viability of the extended LRI by means of an elaborate example.
The Logic of Reasonable Inferences
The Logic of Reasonable Inferences (LRI), with which we have proposed to model legal reasoning as described above [de Vey Mestdagh, 1991] , uses the language of predicate calculus, as this language seems powerful enough to express legal rules and factual situations without losing any relevant information. Section 3.1.1 lists our notational conventions and illustrates some predicate calculus concepts. In section 3.1.2 the LRI is defined, and in section 3.1.3 the LRI is compared with Reiter's Default Reasoning and with Poole's framework for Default Reasoning, both typical representatives of the approach that involves retraction as a decision-making strategy. In section 3.2 we present a decision making strategy using meta-predicates as ranking arguments.
Predicate Calculus Conventions
This section describes those concepts of predicate calculus that we use to define the logic. This is intended to be a quick reminder rather than an exhaustive or precise introduction. We therefore presuppose some elementary knowledge of predicate calculus, and we assume that the more rigorous definitions will be used for the concepts we will only touch upon here.
is the language of the logic containing all syntactically correct formulae, called the well-formed formulae (wff) of the logic. It will contain predicate symbols such as =, function symbols, and logic operators such as ∧ (conjunction), ∨ (disjunction), ¬ (negation) and → (implication).
A theory Γ is a set of wff in . The semantic derivability relation denoted by makes the distinction between correct and incorrectconclusions drawn from a theory. If a wff φ is semantically derivable from a theory Γ, we write Γ φ. The definition of is the usual one.
If Γ is empty we write φ, which means that φ is universally valid. A theory Γ is called inconsistent if there exists some φ such that both Γ φ and Γ ¬φ hold. A theory is called consistent if and only if (iff) it is not inconsistent.
Inconsistency and the Logic of Reasonable Inferences
The predicate calculus definition of semantical derivability seems to be a fairly reasonable one, but it enjoys a peculiar property if theories are allowed to be inconsistent: anything can then be derived from them! Thus, if Γ is an inconsistent theory, then Γ φ for any φ ∈ . Theories like this are called trivial, and logics that render inconsistent theories trivial are called explosive.
Explosiveness conflicts with any intuitive understanding of derivability. We surely do not want to conclude from an inconsistent theory on environmental law that the obligation to possess an environmental permit implies that one does not perform activities which concern the environment, or that all farmers are civil servants. One is not liable to accept any derivation of a formula containing concepts not present in the theory from which it was derived.
To describe this issue in a more formal framework, let Γ be an inconsistent theory in . Let α be a wff in only containing variable, constant, predicate and function symbols that occur in some wff in Γ, and let β be a wff in containing some variable, constant, predicate and function symbols not occurring in any wff in Γ. Then the intuitively undesirable property can be formally described by the observation that predicate calculus with its definition of yields Γ α and Γ β for any α and β defined as above, whereas one would more or less agree with a definition of satisfying the constraint Γ β for any β as defined above (unless of course β holds, in which case β is a universally valid formula).
Inconsistent theories, which model the body of rules of law, have their use in legal reasoning, as has been argued in section 2. Therefore, our definition of semantic derivability must surely avoid the property of predicate calculus derivability concerning inconsistent theories by responding to inconsistent theories along the lines described in the previous paragraph. This can be achieved by demanding that every justification for a derived conclusion is internally consistent, where a justification is the set of rules and observations (facts) used to derive the conclusion. This demand is a straightforward observation taken from legal reasoning theory.
These constraints lead to the definition of a new (non-explosive) semantic derivability relation r for the Logic of Reasonable Inferences (LRI). The language of the LRI equals that of predicate calculus. The LRI can be classified as a paraconsistent logic (cf [Priest, 2002] . A logic is paraconsistent iff its logical consequence relation is not explosive. Paraconsistent logics accommodate inconsistency in a manner that treats inconsistent information as informative. There are different systems of paraconsistent logic e.g. discussive logic, non-adjunctive systems, preservationism, adaptive logics, logics of formal inconsistency, manyvalued logics and relevant logics. The LRI is closely related to the nonadjunctive systems, specifically to the non-adjunctive strategy proposed by [Rescher & Manor, 1970] . However, the LRI differs from these systems in its use of consistent subsets of premises instead of maximally consistent subsets of premises and structured premise-sets (axioms and hypotheses). These differences are required by legal domain specifics. An individual legal opinion is a consistent subset of all the axioms (ascertained facts and shared opinions) and a consistent selection of individually adhered hypotheses (non-shared opinions). Individual legal opinions (as opposed to maximal subsets) should be distinguished because they have to be compared in order for a legal decision to be made. In accordance with this demand, in section 3.2 we extend the LRI with meta-predicates, which can be used as ranking arguments in legal decision making.
Definition (domain of rules)
A domain of rules in , or reasonable theory, is a tuple Δ defined as , where A and H are sets of wff in . A contains the axioms, and H contains the assumptions (hypotheses). A is required to be consistent. Δ
The assumptions model the rules of law that may or may not be applied in a given factual situation to derive a conclusion and contain all normative or subjective classifications of the factual situation. The axioms are intended to be valid in every justification and thus restrict the number of possible justifications. These axioms represent the ascertained facts and previously ascertained conclusions (the permanent database in any implementation). where is the normal predicate calculus semantic derivability relation. If Δ r φ holds, φ is said to be a reasonable inference from the domain of rules Δ. Δ
Definition (position within a domain)
We can paraphrase this definition by stating that a wff can reasonably be inferred from an inconsistent set of wff iff it is derivable (in the normal predicate calculus sense) from a consistent subset of this set which contains at least the axioms. Note that if a domain of rules Δ = A,H is consistent (i.e. if A ∪ H = Γ is consistent), then Δ r φ Γ φ behaves exactly like when applied to consistent theories.
In this setting, a justification for a conclusion φ derived from a domain of rules Δ is a minimal position (with respect to set-inclusion) J within Δ such that J φ. This definition is based on the more intuitive definition as a set of rules and statements about the factual situation used to draw the conclusion. Note that a justification needs not be unique but is always consistent, thus satisfying our constraints.
A context in Δ is the union of n simultaneously derived conclusions ψ i and their justifications J i derived from Δ, i.e. a context is the set of tuples { J i , ψ i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. The J i must however satisfy:
This guarantees that simultaneously derived conclusions are not based on mutually inconsistent positions, and that holds. For a proof see the weak conjunction lemma stated below.
is consistent
To clarify the behaviour of r we will consider an example.
Example 1:
Suppose we have the following domain of rules Δ = A,H defined as
where WCP refers to 'waste in common parlance' and USE to 'used for a specific purpose' and
where WAS refers to 'waste' From this formal structure, we can derive whether WAS(A) or ¬WAS(A), using the definition of reasonable inferences. This definition suggests that we should first of all find all possible positions within Δ. Using the definition of a position within a domain, we obtain the following positions:
Of course, all subsets of the above positions are also positions within Δ. These positions represent the possible ways (views) to tackle this legal problem. From these positions, we derive the contexts:
with justification: { USE(A), WCP(A), ∀ x(WCP(x) → WAS(x)) } (2) ф 2 ¬WAS(A) with justification: { WCP(A), USE(A), ∀ x(USE(x) → ¬WAS(x)) }
From this we can conclude Δ r WAS(A) as well as Δ r ¬WAS(A). This result implies that further investigation of the justifications on which these contradictory conclusions are based must resolve whether WAS(A) or ¬WAS(A) must be concluded. Δ To demonstrate the viability of this logic formally, we will prove two lemmas stating important properties.
The first lemma states that the logic is safe in the sense that one cannot derive contradictions from it, thus representing the property that all contexts are contradiction-free.
Lemma (contradictions):
Let φ be a wff in . If φ is a contradiction, i.e. ¬φ, then Δ r φ for any domain of rules Δ. Δ Proof: Suppose that φ is a contradiction, and that Δ r φ does hold. Then there exists a position ф within Δ which justifies φ, i.e. such that ф φ. If Δ = {},{} then ф = {} will suffice. But also ф ¬φ, since ¬φ, which contradicts the fact that, by definition, ф is consistent. Δ The next lemma states that a weak conjunction rule holds if both conclusions are derived from mutually consistent justifications. This indicates that the conjunction rule only holds for mutually consistent justifications and not for mutually inconsistent justifications. The legal connotation of this lemma is that justifications which consist of conflicting opinions cannot be joined.
Lemma (weak conjunction):
Let α and β be wff in . Let Δ be an arbitrary domain of rules in . Suppose that Δ r α and Δ r β 
Δ
To show that the general conjunction rule does not hold, i.e. that it is not the case that if Δ r α and Δ r β we can conclude Δ r α Λ β, the following example should suffice.
Example 2:
Let Δ be the following domain of rules Δ = {},{γ,¬γ, γ → α, ¬γ → β} with suitable α, β and γ, then we have Δ r α, with Φ = { γ, γ → α} and Δ r β with Φ = {¬γ, ¬γ → β } but not Δ r α Λ β. Δ This behaviour is caused by the mutual inconsistency of the justifications on which the conclusions are based.
Comparison to Default Reasoning
The Logic of Reasonable Inferences (LRI) is, in some important aspects, similar to Reiter's Default Reasoning when applied to normal default theories. However, there is a crucial formal difference as well as a difference in proposed use. In this section, we investigate the similarities, and indicate the essential points of difference. For a thorough description of default reasoning, we refer to Reiter's original article [Reiter, 1980] . Default reasoning was proposed as a model for reasoning with incomplete knowledge (e.g. birds can fly, ostriches are birds) and the retraction of previously derived conclusions (e.g. ostriches can fly) in the light of new information (e.g. ostriches can't fly). 
as rules of inference (like modus ponens).
A default theory is a pair (D,W) of a set of default rules D and a set of wff W. A normal default theory is a default theory in which all default rules in D are normal.
The first point of comparison between the LRI and default reasoning is that they are both non-monotonic logics. Let Th(T) be the set of wff derivable from theory T within a certain logic, then the logic is called monotonic iff
and non-monotonic otherwise. This definition can be understood to mean that by using a monotonic logic, a conclusion derived from a given theory remains valid if new statements are added to the theory.
The non-monotonic nature of the LRI is stated in the following lemma (a similar lemma holds for default reasoning, see [Reiter, 1980, p.75 Theorem 3.2] , and for Poole's framework, see [Poole, 1988, p To contradict (b) we only need to observe the counterexample {}, {α, α → β} β and {¬ α } {α, α → β}, β. Δ This lemma shows that the logic is monotonic in H but non-monotonic in A. As pointed out above, the axioms A are intended to model some ascertained facts and previously ascertained inferences. The legal connotation of this lemma is that, if the axiom set is extended with an ascertained conclusion based on a choice of one of the alternative opinions, the number of derivations is restricted because contexts including the alternative conclusions are no longer constructed.
The similarity between the LRI and default reasoning becomes apparent if we consider the logical framework for default reasoning suggested by Poole [Poole, 1988] and applied to legal document assembly by Gordon [Gordon, 1989] . Poole defines a new semantic derivability relation Δ = A,H which behaves like default reasoning with respect to free default theories, and which can be used to model general default theories [Poole, 1988] . We paraphrase his definition below, using our own notational conventions. Note that in Poole's framework defaults are explicit, whereas Reiter considers default rules as rules of inference.
Definition (Poole's semantics of default reasoning):
Let F and D be sets of wff in the language of predicate calculus. F is the set of facts (like W in default reasoning) and D is the set of default rules (like D in default reasoning, but the default rules are now denoted as ordinary wff). The new semantic derivability relation d is defined as is the normal semantic derivability relation of predicate calculus. A ground instance of a wff ψ is the wff resulting from renaming all bound variables to unique variable names in ψ, then removing all quantifiers in ψ (thus freeing all bound variables) from the result, and substituting constants for all free variables (i.e. all variables) after that. Δ
Formal differences
The crucial difference between the definition of r and Poole's d is that Poole specifies that D' is a subset of all possible ground instances of wff in D, whereas we (if we equate A with F and H with D) specify H' (equated with D') as merely a subset of H.
Consequently, D' does not contain the default rules but only a subset of ground instances, whereas H' does contain the rules themselves. This reflects the formal difference between default rules and the formal representation of rules of law. Default rules represent general statements about reality which can be overridden by facts. Rules of law represent, possibly co-existing, opinions about the normative properties of reality, which only can be overruled by applying meta-rules. At a more concrete level this implies that the LRI insists that all consequences of a rule (representing an opinion) applied once within some context should hold within that context, that is to say no opposing opinions are allowed to co-exist within one context. We can clarify this by means of the example from Dutch environmental law introduced above.
Assume that we have the following set of facts, representing one case: WCP(wreckage) , USE(rubble), USE(wreckage)} in both systems, and the following set of rules in default reasoning and
in the LRI, modelling the same rules.
Then in default reasoning the following ground instances are produced:
USE(rubble) → ¬WAS(rubble) 2. USE(wreckage) → ¬WAS(wreckage) 3. WCP(rubble) → WAS(rubble) 4. WCP(wreckage) → WAS(wreckage)
Combined with the facts, default logic produces four extensions:
Th( WCP(rubble), WCP(wreckage), USE(rubble), USE(wreckage), USE(rubble) → ¬WAS(rubble), USE(wreckage) → ¬WAS(wreckage),

¬WAS(rubble), ¬WAS(wreckage) ) 2. Th( WCP(rubble), WCP(wreckage), USE(rubble), USE(wreckage), USE(rubble) → ¬WAS(rubble), WCP(wreckage) → WAS(wreckage),
¬WAS(rubble), WAS(wreckage) ) 3. Th( WCP(rubble), WCP(wreckage), USE(rubble), USE(wreckage), USE(wreckage) → ¬WAS(wreckage), WCP(rubble) → WAS(rubble),
¬WAS(wreckage), WAS(rubble) ) 4. Th( WCP(rubble), WCP(wreckage), USE(rubble), USE(wreckage), WCP(rubble) → WAS(rubble), WCP(wreckage) → WAS(wreckage),
WAS(wreckage), WAS(rubble) )
whereas, the LRI will only produce two contexts.
The LRI defines the following positions:
From these positions, the following contexts will be produced:
with justification {WCP(rubble),WCP(wreckage),USE(rubble),USE(wreckage),
∀x(USE(x) → ¬WAS(x))} (2) Φ2 { WAS(rubble) ∧ WAS(wreckage) } with justification {WCP(rubble),WCP(wreckage),USE(rubble),USE(wreckage),
∀x(WCP(x) → WAS(x))}
These contexts are produced following the constraint that a rule, (representing an opinion) once used within a context, should hold within that context, thus discarding the contextual translations of extensions 2 and 3.
Extending the Logic of Reasonable Inferences: meta-predicates as ranking arguments
The Logic of Reasonable Inferences (LRI) reduces the set of all a priori known and deducible normative opinions to the set of all formally valid normative opinions. Formally, valid normative opinions (reasonable inferences) are internally consistent but can be mutually (meaningfully) inconsistent. As we have shown in the previous sections, there are no absolute criteria to retract (any but one of) these meaningful inconsistent opinions in order to reach a common opinion. In legal practice, three classes of tentative principles are used to rank these opinions. The meta-predicates Valid, Exclude and Prefer can be used in meta-rules from these three classes of tentative ranking principles.
4
Formally, within the context of the LRI, a meta-predicate can be defined as a normal predicate calculus predicate with individual constants of object type 'rule' or variables of entity-type 'rule'. Variables can be informally typed by predication or they can be formally typed by means of the introduction of sorted predicate logic, which allows for the typing of variables [Gamut, 1991] .
which can be denoted as the meta-rule
The meta-rules introduced in the example from Dutch environmental law above can be formally represented as follows:
In section 2.2, three classes of legal decision principles were identified, which can be denoted by the unary meta-predicate Valid and the binary meta-predicates Exclude and Prefer. These classes of meta-predicates each play a distinctive role in legal decision-making by providing a class-specific type of rule-ranking arguments. These rule-ranking arguments can be defined by their semantic properties, which are based on the way they are actually applied in legal practice.
The following table contains the semantic properties of the three classes of ranking arguments. r1 and r2, represent two different rules at the object level. R12 means an opinion containing both r1 and r2. R1 means an opinion containing r1 but not r2. R2 means an opinion containing r2 but not r1. r1 and r2 do contradict if their consequents formally oppose. Rx>Ry and Rx>>Ry mean that Rx ranks higher than Ry, where >> is stronger than > (no quantification). Rx=Ry means that Rx ranks equally to Ry. To paraphrase the main properties:
Valuation
• A fortiori argument: combined, not invalid arguments (R12) rank highest; • Legal validity: a legally valid argument outranks a non-valid or not valid argument;
• Legal exclusion: an exclusive argument takes priority, also over the combined arguments;
• Legal preference: a preferred argument takes priority, but not over the combined arguments.
The above semantic properties can be used by an external human or computer agent to compute a ranking as will be illustrated by example in the next section.
Application of the extended Logic of Reasonable Inferences
To illustrate the discussed properties of normative reasoning and decision-making and to clarify the behavior of the proposed logic, we will now present a complex legal case that we will refer to as the topdown case. The facts of this case are hypothetical, but all the legal considerations are taken from real cases. An attempt is commonly defined as an uncompleted act in which circumstances independent of the will of the performer prevented the act from being completed. Section 45 of the Dutch penal code defines the concept of criminal attempt as follows: criminal intent should be revealed by a first act of execution (element) of a criminal offence. Suppose that during a conference visit to Pisa (Italy) we become involved in some heavy drinking one night. Furthermore, suppose that we wander over to the Tower of Pisa (top). To get rid of the strain of logical thinking, we decide to topple the top and we start shouting "we are going to get you down" and start pushing. Fortunately, what Shakespeare said in Macbeth was perfectly right. Drinking provokes the desire, but it takes away the performance. So our attempt is not very successful. Now, did we commit a criminal attempt under Dutch penal law? Of course not, you may respond. Literally there is a criminal attempt because there is intent (supposing that we drank enough to believe that we could succeed) and the intent is revealed by a first act of execution (pushing) of a criminal offence (section 141 of the Dutch penal code: the public use of violence against persons or goods in conjunction with others), but the attempt is clearly unsound as it cannot result in the intended consequence, and nobody will think otherwise. Apart from that, Dutch penal jurisdiction is restricted by the principle of territoriality, so let us adapt the case slightly by bringing the Tower of Pisa into our own jurisdiction. As this is a formal discourse, we will gratefully leave the technical details of the transposition to the engineers. Furthermore, let us suppose that the poor condition of the Tower of Pisa has recently once again been brought to the attention of the public and that a (deviant) scientist has suggested publicly (in a scientific publication) that combined manpower is enough to topple the Tower of Pisa (but fortunately has not proven this experimentally). Things are becoming more complex now.
In this case there are more fish in the lake of jurisprudence and legal practice than you probably can imagine. Jurisprudence offers us at least three alternative ways of solving this legal problem. All of these have been applied (acted as concurring or dissenting opinions) in legal practice, but only the first two of them have been decisive in one or more cases. In the Dutch legal system thoughts are never punishable, so you can have as many mischievous thoughts as you like. The expression of thoughts as criminal intent, however, is punishable under certain circumstances. These circumstances are defined in different ways by three dominant opinions about the meaning of the concept of criminal attempt. These are the so-called subjectivist, objectivist and impressionist (eindrucks-) doctrines.
The subjectivist view states that the criminal intent of the suspect renders as a first act of execution (element) of a criminal offence any act he thinks fit to fulfil his criminal aims. Therefore, the mere wish of the suspect to destroy the tower, the fact that this would be a criminal offence and his belief that he can destroy the tower are sufficient to conclude that this is a criminal attempt. This subjectivist view has been repeatedly applied by Dutch courts in cases of unsound attempts. However, a distinction has been made between absolutely and relatively unsound attempts (by means and object). For example, murdering or raping a dead body or trying to poison someone with a substance that is commonly known to be non-poisonous are qualified as absolutely unsound, whereas robbing an empty bank or being caught approaching the border with goods that only turn into contraband when you cross the border are qualified as relatively unsound. The distinction is, of course, blurred and misguiding because both shooting a body and robbing a bank will generally have the intended consequences, while approaching a border is not the first element of the criminal act of smuggling. Sticking pins into Voodoo dolls is another example of the inadequacy of this distinction, since this act can have a physical effect on a true believer 5 . For the sake of the above example, however, we will presume that the subjective impression of the suspect and the chance of succeeding in general suffice. It is not absolutely (as 'in any case') impossible to topple a tower with human power and, moreover, in this case a scientific publication has proposed that such an event might be possible
The objectivist view states that the first act really must be fit to cause the following elements in order for a criminal offence to take place. In this view, the unsoundness of an attempt prohibits it from being classified as a criminal attempt. Trying to topple the Tower of Pisa would not be a criminal attempt according to the objectivists if the (deviant) scientist proves to be wrong in his opinion. The objectivists will argue that the unsound attempt to destroy the tower of Pisa cannot possibly be an element of the criminal offence of public violence. However, in many cases the objectivist view would lead to bizarre results. This would be the case, for example, when the suspect intends to drown his victim by throwing him from a bridge only for the victim to die in the course of the action by bumping his head on the balustrade before hitting the water. Another example of a suspect who does not commit a criminal attempt according to the objectivists would be somebody who tries to poison his victim by mistakenly giving him sugar Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Aug., 1983), pp. 3-19. instead of the intended arsenic dose. However gruesome the intent may be, the attempt to kill or poison is not qualified as a criminal attempt in these cases. So in such cases the subjectivist view would make more sense.
Finally, the impressionist view states that the public alarm (the impact or eindruck on the public sense of justice) caused by an attempt can make it a criminal attempt. In the case of a robust tower, most people would laugh and maybe even try to 'help' you. In the case of the tower of Pisa, however, there is a possibility that your attempt would arouse so much public unrest that it would qualify as criminal (cf someone shouting "I'll bomb this site" and waving an indistinct parcel at Ground Zero). If we had left the Tower of Pisa in Pisa, and thus under Italian jurisdiction, the local impressionist opinion would probably be absolutely positive about the criminality of the attempt. The impressionist view has not been decisive in criminal attempt cases. However, in other criminal cases, where the penal code could not keep pace with reality, it has been decisive, for example in extending the reach of the larceny section of the penal code to electricity and even to data. Finally, the Voodoo doll attempt case would probably not be a criminal attempt in Holland, but it possibly would be in Jamaica.
How may a case like this be decided? In this case there are many legal principles that can help. We will present four of them in order to illustrate the characteristics, specifically the tentative character, of the decision-making process.
From case law we can conclude that the subjectivist and objectivist views are positively valid in the sense that they have been applied and have been decisive in a number of precedents 6 , whereas the impressionist view has been applied as an alternative opinion (in most cases in support of the subjectivist view) more than once, indicating that its validity is contingent. Therefore, all three views can be used at will 6 The prevalence of statutory law as the main source of legal decision-making in the continental system of justice as opposed to the prevalence of precedents in the common law system of justice is a coarse generalization. The formal principle of equality, amongst other things, introduces precedents in the continental system. For a more complete discussion see: Internet en de toegankelijkheid van het recht: van informatievoorziening naar kennisoverdracht. C.N.J. de Vey Mestdagh. Response, Jaargang 4, nr. 1, 1996. again in cases coming up in any court of law, but the first two views take precedence over the third (without excluding it).
The statutory principle of legality (section 1 of the Dutch Penal Code) demands that an explicit description of a criminal offence from a statutory law must be fulfilled for an act to be punishable. In cases of attempt, this principle is interpreted to mean that an explicit description of a criminal offence is fulfilled by the act of intent and its probable consequences. This seems to favor the objectivist opinion, as it demands that at least the first element of a criminal offence has actually been performed. However, as we have seen, there are examples of the application of the other views in case law. Therefore, we must conclude that this interpretation of the legal principle of legality is tentative and not coercive by nature. In cases concerning criminal attempt, the principle only adds validity to the objectivist view, but does not decide the case.
The lex specialis-principle (lex specialis derogat legi generali) entails that specialized laws prevail over general laws (where law should be interpreted to mean categorical normative statement). The principle is not absolute in the sense that it should lead to retraction of the general law, but it strongly advocates the separate application of the specialized normative statement over the separate application of the general normative statement and the separate application of either statement over their combined application.
Finally, since the beginning of this century, the growing influence of terrorism-induced public policy means that legislators, governments and judges prefer opinions that soothe public alarm. Laws have been changed or reinterpreted, government policies have been adjusted and judicial decisions have been biased in order to allow the authorities to take action even in the phase of 'possible preparation of acts that possibly will disturb the public order'. The effectiveness of this policy unfortunately cannot be the subject of scientific research for lack of reliable data. However, the aforementioned effect on the legal system is certain. The fact that opinions that soothe public alarm take preference does not have the excluding effect as in the case of the lex specialisprinciple described above. 'Taking preference' means that an opinion containing the preferred rule is preferred above an opinion that separately applies the non-preferred rule, whereas an opinion containing both rules is preferred above an opinion that separately applies the preferred rule. The non-preferred rule is not excluded by the preferred rule. It will even reinforce the application of the preferred rule if is part of the same opinion.
The top-down case described above can be formalized as follows using the extended formalization of the Logic of Reasonable Inferences (LRI) from the previous section:
From the case description we have the following axiom set: By shouting "We are going to get you down", and by actually pushing the top, we reveal intent to topple the top and that the intent is aimed at publicly using violence against a good, which is a criminal offence. As the attempt is clearly unsound, there is no first element of the offence of public violence, supposing the deviant scientist was not right after all. In this case, we assume that the nearby public perceived our action as an offence, and we assume that the opinion of our deviant scientist recently caused public alarm. Furthermore, we add the precedent status of the subjectivist and objectivist views (tagged as R1 and R2), the compliance of the objectivist view with the principle of legality and the specialis relation between the objectivist and subjectivist view, the objectivist view being the specialis because it shares all subjectivist clauses and has an extra clause. Finally, we express the fact that the subjectivist and impressionist (tagged as R3) views soothe public alarm whereas the objectivist view does not.
Furthermore, the case description provides us with the following (selection 7 of) hypotheses (i.e. opinions/(meta-)rules): The meta-rules comprised in these four positions (H.4-H.7) provide ranking arguments that allow for a variety of actual rankings depending on the actual local policies of (human-or computer-) decision-makingagents or agents involved in a dialogue. Meta-rule H.4 (validity based on precedent) can be used to rank the positions P.1, P.2 and P.4 above position P.3 if a local policy decides for positions containing inferences based on valid rules. Meta-rule H.5 (validity based on legality) can be used to rank position P.2 above the other three positions based on the same local policy. Meta-rule H.6 (exclusion based on specificity) can be used to rank position P.2 above position P.1 if a local policy decides for specialis positions 9 . Meta-rule H.7 (preference based on the soothing of 8 The selection of certain positions by an external agent can also be based on the application of meta-rules (e.g. meta-rules preferring pure positions like the subjectivists, objectivists and impressionists positions). 9 The relativity or non-absoluteness of such a local policy can be easily understood. If a generalis is provable and a specialis is not, a specific type of local policies (e.g that public alarm) can be used to rank position P.4 above positions P.1 and P.3 and positions P.1 and P.3 above position P.2 if a local policy makes decisions on the basis of (the reduction of) public alarm (for example shortly after 9/11 or in a case that took place in the vicinity of Ground Zero, or by an agent that was hurt by the same peril or that has an audience of agents hurt in that way etc.). Since there is no single/absolute ranking model (on the contrary, there are many competing local ranking models in most cases), the ranking process cannot be a part of the extended LRI 10 . A specific local policy could decide for position P.2 because it is up in three of the four rankings. This has actually been the dominant opinion of a majority of Dutch courts.
From these positions, two contexts can be derived. applied by the DA) will decide for the generalis. The problem is that we cannot describe all the types of local policies and even less all the actual local policies of a type. 10 Actually it could be part of the extended LRI if all the local ranking policies were known. However, in that case the number of positions would explode in another sense than in the case of inconsistency in classical logic.
C(ONTEXTS) (showing only the dissimilar inferences)
other hand, the extended LRI provides all reasonable inferences about the Tower of Pisa It presents these reasonable inferences in combination with their justifications as contexts. Furthermore, it provides the ranking arguments resulting in the four rankings as presented above. Since three of the four rankings prefer P.2, a human or computer agent using these ranking arguments will probably decide to C.2 (which is justified by P.2) as the common opinion. This means that a confusing multitude of positions is reduced to the minimum of consistent contexts and that each context provides the ranking arguments that can be weighed by a subsequent choice of local ranking policies. The example shows that rather complex decision processes can be supported by the extended LRI. The extended LRI provides the global arguments (the coloration) for choosing a certain position but it does not cause retraction of positions, in perfect agreement with the theoretical demands for normative decision-making discussed in the first two sections.
Conclusions and further research
Information processing and information are naturally perspective-bound. This often results in naturally inconsistent opinions. Effective communication can demand the local and temporal acceptance of a common opinion by the parties concerned. Legal reasoning and legal decision-making are respectively aimed at deriving all alternative legally-valid opinions and deciding on a common opinion. Legal reasoning can be modeled by the Logic of Reasonable Inferences (LRI), which allows for internally consistent opinions, thus abiding by the principle of rationality and avoiding triviality without discarding mutually inconsistent opinions. The introduction and semantic definition of three classes of meta-predicates (legal validity, legal exclusion and legal preference) within the, thus extended, LRI allows for the derivation of ranking arguments that can subsequently be used computationally to model legal decision-making through the ranking of alternative opinions. Past research has confirmed that the extended LRI is a tenable model of legal reasoning and legal decision-making. Further research should elaborate on the formal properties of the three classes of meta-predicates (e.g. their applicability to positions and contexts as a whole instead of just to the rules that are part of the positions) and their applicability in other knowledge domains and in ranking algorithms.
